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“So long as we think of ourselves as discrete, atomistic, autonomous beings, we will be saddled with a politics of antagonism and clashing interests. This is so because when we think of ourselves as discrete substances, we will tend to think of our interests and tastes as fixed and exclusive. Instead of looking for ways that our interests intersect, we will focus on how they differ. Instead of seeing the polis–that is, our communities–as constitutive of our being, we will see them as separate sites of struggle.” McAfee, Noelle. Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship. Cornell University Press. 2000. p. 7.


"First, culture is almost identical to people or nation, as in French culture, German culture, Iranian culture, etc. Second, culture refers to art, music, literature, educational television, certain kinds of movies--in short, everything that is uplifting and edifying, as opposed to commerce. The link is that culture is what makes possible, on a high level, the rich social life that constitutes a people, their customs, styles, tastes, festivals, rituals, gods--all that binds individuals into a group with roots, a community in which they think and will generally, with the people a moral unity, and the individual united within himself. A culture is a work of art, of which the fine arts are the sublime expression. From this point of view, liberal democracies look like disorderly markets to which individuals bring their produce in the morning and from which they return in the evening to enjoy privately what they have purchased with the proceeds of their sales. In culture, on the other hand, the individuals are formed by the collectivity as are the members of the chorus of a Greek drama. A Charles de Gaulle or, for that matter, an Alexander Solzhenitsyn sees the United States as a mere aggregate of individuals, a dumping ground for the refuse from other places, devoted to consuming; in short, no culture.

"Culture as art is the peak expression of man's creativity, his capacity to break out of nature's narrow bonds, and hence out of the degrading interpretation of man in modern natural and political science. Culture founds the dignity of man. Culture as a form of community is the fabric of relations in which the self finds its diverse and elaborate expression. It is the house of the self, but also its product. It is profounder than the modern state, which deals only with man's bodily needs and tends to degenerate into mere economy. Such a state is not a forum in which man can act without deforming himself. This is why in the better circles it always seems in poor taste to speak of love of country, while devotion to Western, or even American, culture is perfectly respectable. Culture restores 'the unity in art and life' of the ancient polis.

"The only element of the polis absent from culture is politics....

"The disappearance of politics is one of the most salient aspects of modern thought and has much to do with our political practice. Politics tends to disappear into the subpolitical (economics) or what claims to be higher than politics (culture)..." Bloom, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind, Simon and Schuster, 1987, pps. 187-8.


"Here is the inner contradiction in liberty, equality, and fraternity. Sonship and brotherhood are espoused against fatherhood: but without a father there can be no sons or brothers. Locke's sons, like Freud's, cannot free themselves from father psychology, and are crucified by the contradictory commands issuing from the Freudian super-ego, which says both 'thou shalt be like the father,' and 'thou shalt not be like the father,' that is, many things are his prerogative. Fraternal organization in the body politic corresponds to ego-organization in the body physical. As fraternal organization covertly assumes a father, ego-organization covertly assumes a super-ego." O. Brown, Norman, Love's Body, Vintage, 1966, pp. 5-6.


“States dominate the world scene like so many drunk and brutal Titans, simultaneously powerful and impotent. How can we survive their barbarous reign?” Morin, Edgar. Homeland Earth: A Manifesto for a New Millennium. 1999. Hampton Press. p. 56.


“A ‘psychology of faculties’ has been cast upon political organization. The problem for a democratic order under law is to determine the collective will by reason, rather than desire. Politics is conceived as a struggle between good and evil, represented by reason and desire. This Manichean image of struggle ensures the continuing centrality of the idea of reform.” Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law. University of Chicago Press. 1999. p. 17.


“Reason and will are equally foundational but ultimately irreconcilable principles of the legal order. They are reconciled in practice, but not in theory....

Some contemporary legal scholarship seeks a position between these two poles, holding for intellectual coherence in a compromise that does not appeal simply to a practice of judicial statesmanship. These theorists tend to attack the traditional abstractness of both reason and will. What is abstract appears either as empty or, even worse, as a mere cover for very particular interests. Abstract reason may be only a false appearance, for example, of patriarchal interests; abstract will, only a false appearance of class-based, economic interests. Opposed to this dialectic of the abstract and the particular, these theories seek compromise in ideas of narrative, discourse, and communities of interpretation. On this view, law is founded in an historically specific discourse that gives shape simultaneously to individual identity and community values.” Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law. University of Chicago Press. 1999. pps. 22-3.

“The history of scientific inquiry is a narrative of progress in which the present constantly supersedes the past. The history of law’s rule, on the other hand, is a collection of interpretive commentaries.” Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law. University of Chicago Press. 1999. p 54.


“Law is indifferent to the unique character of the acting subject or the unique circumstances of the act. For a legal decision maker to be swayed by either appears unfair and prejudicial. This is true even if that outcome appears otherwise morally compelling. Under the rule of law, the morally good do not necessarily win their cases over the morally evil. Justice under law, we say, is blind. It need not see what actually happens, because law’s meaning is already exhausted by what can happen. Only in law is blindness a good thing; in a complete inversion of our ordinary experience, sight appears to lead to arbitrary and capricious behavior by the legal decision maker.”

“Political action understands the event in just the opposite way. It locates the meaning of the event in the fact of its happening, not in its realization of a possibility already established by a rule. Its concern is the unique subject and the particular historical circumstances. Action sees the event as the product of particular choices made by particular subjects at unique moments. It is a matter of seizing opportunities, not maintaining the past. Political action emphasizes the subject’s responsibility for the choice made: what matters is what we do, not what it is possible for us to do. Action is seen as a test of character: it tells us–and others–who we actually are. Possibilities are always indefinite and indeterminate. They cannot determine the actual course of events. For law, possibility precedes and limits actuality. For action, it is the actual choice that constructs future possibilities.” Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law. University of Chicago Press. 1999. p. 70.


“Legal practice includes a variety of techniques for suppressing the subjecthood of the judge.” Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law. University of Chicago Press. 1999. p. 79.


“If we could not achieve the suppression of our particular, unique subjecthood, we would see law’s rule as something done to us, rather than as something we do as a part of the transtemporal, popular sovereign.” Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law. University of Chicago Press. 1999. p. 81.


“Punishment marks another point of convergence of this double conception of the self as sovereign and as subject. The prisoner suffers the complete suppression of the self as a potential political actor. We judge him entirely by his crime and deny any meaning to the criminal act beyond the expression of law’s rule through the act’s negation. His subjecthood is exhausted in his representation of the rule of law. He is no longer a person but a legal placeholder. The tremendous rates of incarceration in this country have to do not just with failures of the welfare state and programs of rehabilitation; they also express our unique commitment to law’s rule as our political culture.” Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law. University of Chicago Press. 1999. p. 82.


“Hobbes, Spinoza, and Vico sought to defend and to define existing political institutions on the basis of a realistic assessment of ‘man as he is, not as he should be.’ They represent basic prototypes of anti-utopian thinking grown out of the experience of the modern state. Their defense of political realism is based on a radical interpretation of society or the state as a product of human efforts, or labor. Yet, an ultimate difference separates Vico from both Hobbes and Spinoza. Hobbes and Spinoza believed society to be an outcome of rational design, though Hobbes believed only one design could ensure the durability of the state. Vico, on the other hand, believed it to be a product of a long evolution in which the individual or a group could not, or should not, interfere. The ‘mechanization’ of political theory or its rejection thus helped to forumlate two basic patterns in the varieties of the conservative ideologies to come. We can call them, in anticipation, the positivistic and the evolutionary defense of existing orders. Hobbes and Spinoza believed that the state needs the mature participation of each of its members; every order, inasmuch as it is genuine order, is worth conservation, yet conserving it is an incessant and conscious task for all. This type of conservatism shares its premises with the utopian or revolutionary ideologies it detests, namely the recognition of the state as a product of design; it merely negates the wisdom of radical changes. Unwillingly, one could say, Hobbes and Spinoza even prepared the rational idiom of revolutions, while Vico, well aware of the dangers implied in regarding the state as a design always in need of deliberate adjustments to new realities, insisted on the anonymous, almost instinctive amelioration of the human condition. In it he saw the working of providence, the ‘invisible hand’ of God or nature.” Funkenstein, Amos. Theology and the Scientific Imagination From the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton University Press. 1986. p. 288-9.


"There are at least two kinds of games. One could be called finite, the other infinite.

"A finite game is played for the purpose of winning, an infinite game for the purpose of continuing the play...."

"Finite players play within boundaries; infinite players play with boundaries...."

"A finite player is trained not only to anticipate every future possibility, but to control the future, to prevent it from altering the past...."

"Surprise causes finite play to end; it is the reason for infinite play to continue...."

"When I speak as the genius I am, I speak these words for the first time. To repeat words is to speak them as though another were saying them, in which case I am not saying them...."

"When I forsake my genius and speak to you as though I were another, I also speak to you as someone you are not and somewhere you are not."
"I am touched only if I respond from my own center--that is, spontaneously, originally. But you do not touch me except from your own center, out of your own genius....

"The opposite of touching is moving. You move me by pressing me from without toward a place you have already foreseen and perhaps prepared. It is a staged action that succeeds only if in moving me you remain unmoved yourself....

"A finite game occurs within a world. The fact that it must be limited temporally, numerically, and spatially means that there is something against which the limits stand. There is an outside to every finite game....

"...a finite game occurs within time....

"The infinite player in us does not consume time but generates it." Carse, James P., Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility, Ballantine Books, 1986, pps. 3, 12, 22, 81, 90, 107, 112-3.


“The opposition of law and love is as unresolvable as that of law and revolution. Neither can exist in the presence of the other: one rests on division and distinction , the other on a radical equality. Yet, this opposition, like that of law and revolution, is wholly unstable. Love draws its power from the denial of just those distinctions of citizen/alien, guilty/innocent, rule/ruler upon which law depends. The greater law’s power to affirm itself–to insist upon these distinctions–the more individuals are likely to feel the power of love as an infinite longing to transcend law. Accordingly, law cannot simply exile love to the exterior of the state. No one exercising political power can live in a state that wholly excludes love. The very denial of love’s relevance to political order will call it forth. Love, therefore, threatens law, just as much as law threatens love....

“The relationship of law to love now begins to look like that of law to political action: a competition within a mutual dependence. Each term can literally become the other. Thus love without the protection of law has no power to endure. Without law, love is indistinguishable from madness–the political community has little patience for those who preach the abolition of borders and the common community of mankind. Accordingly, love needs law, as much as law needs love. Love must reenter the city because unless it can colonize the political it cannot survive. Love’s ambition, therefore, is to realize a new community in history. Love spawns its own utopian politics.” Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law. University of Chicago Press. 1999. pp. 121-2.


“A genealogical politics has no necessary political entailments: indeed, the particular kind of discursive space it affords for political thought, judgment, and political interventions is precisely a space free of the notion of necessary entailments. This characteristic is often considered a failing when viewed from a perspective in which legitimate political positions must flow directly from the endpoint of ‘objective’ or ‘systematic’ political critiques, but genealogy refuses this ruse and features instead forthrightly contingent elements of desire, attachment, judgment, and alliance as the composition material of political attachments and positions.” Brown, Wendy. Politics Out of History. Princeton University Press. 2001. P. 119.


“The political spokespersons come to represent the quarrelsome and calculating multitude of citizens; the scientific spokespersons come to represent the mute and material multitude of objects. The former translate their principals, who cannot all speak at once; the latter translate their constituents, who are mute from birth.” Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Harvard. 1993. P. 29.


"To Dobyns, the moral of this story was clear. The Inka, he wrote in his 1963 article, were not defeated by steel and horses but by disease and factionalism. In this he was echoing conclusions drawn centuries before by Pedro Pizaro. Had Wayna Qhapaq 'been alive when we Spaniards entered this land, 'the conquistador remarked, 'it would have been impossible for us to win it... And likewise, had the land not been divided by the [smallpox-induced civil] wars, we would not have been able to enter or win the land.'"

"Pizarro's words, Dobyns realized, applied beyond Tawantinsuyu. He had studied demographic records in both Peru and southern Arizona. In both, as in New England, epidemic disease arrived before the first successful colonists. When the Europeans actually arrived, the battered, fragmented cultures could not unite to resist the incursion. Instead one party, believing that it was about to lose the struggle for dominance, allied with the invaders to improve its position. The alliance was often successful, in that the party gained the desired advantage. But its success was usually temporary and the culture as a whole always lost."

"Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, this pattern occurred again and again in the Americas. It was a kind of master narative of post-contact history. In fact, Europeans routinely lost when they could not take advantage of disease and political fragmentation. Conquistadors tried to take Florida half a dozen times between 1510 and 1560--and failed each time. In 1532 King Joao III of Portugal divided the coast of Brazil into fourteen provinces and dispatched colonists to each one. By 1550 only two settlements survived." Mann, Charles. 2005. 1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus. Alfred Knopf. Pp. 90-2.


"Andean societies were based on the widespread exchange of goods and services, but kin and government, not market forces, directed the flow. The citizenry grew its own food and made its own clothes, or obtained them through their lineages, or picked them up in government warehouses. And the city, as Kolata put it, was a place for 'symbolically concentrating the political and religious authority of the elite.' Other Andean cities, Wari among them, shared this quality. but Tiwanaku carried it to an extreme."

"Tiwanaku has been excavated for a century, and the more archaeologists delve into it the less there seems to be. To Vranich, the capital's lack of resemblance to Eurpoean imperial cities extends well beyond the absence of marketplaces. Far from being the powerful administrative center envisioned by earlier researchers, he says, Tiwanaku was a combination of the Vatican and Disneyland, a religious show capital with a relatively small population--almost a staff--that attracted pilgrims by the thousand. Like the tourists at the solstice today, visitors came to this empire of appearances to be dazzled and awed. 'In the central city, buildings and monuments went up and down, up and down, at an incredible rate,' Vranich told me at Tiwanaku, where he had been working since 1996. 'Nothing ever got finished completely, because they were just concerned with the facades. They had to keep changing the exhibits to keep the crowds coming.'" Mann, Charles. 2005. 1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus. Alfred Knopf. Pp. 233-4.
 

“Distance is not measured only in miles across land and sea; it can also involve less tangible spaces, more abstract conceptions in which distance is assessed across organizations, hierarchies, event sequences, social strata, market relationships, migration patterns, and a host of other nonterritorial spaces. Thus to a large extent distant proximities are subjective appraisals–what people feel or think is remote, and what they think or feel is close-at-hand. There is no self-evident line that divides the distant from the proximate, no established criteria for differentiating among statistics or situations that are reflective of either the more remote or the close-at-hand environment. In other words, nearness and farness connote scale as well as space. Both are ranges across which people and their thoughts roam; and as they roam, they can be active in both geographic locales and scalar spaces that have been socially constructed. Each is a context, a ‘habitat of meaning,’ a mind-set that may often correspond with spatial distance even as there are other scalar contexts that can make the close-at-hand feel very remote and the faraway seem immediately present.” Rosenau, James. Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization. 2003. Princeton University Press. Pp. 6-7.
 

“In Collective Intelligence, Pierre Levy proposes what he calls an ‘achievable utopia’: he asks us to imagine what would happen when the sharing of knowledge and the exercise of grassroots power become normative. In Levy’s world, people from fundamentally different perspectives see a value in talking and listening to one another, and such deliberations form the basis for mutual respect and trust. A similar ideal underlies the work of the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University. Interested in how to reconnect a notion of deliberation – the active ‘weighing’ of evidence and argument – back to popular democracy, they have run a series of tests around the world of new processes whereby participants of diverse political background are brought together – online and sometimes face-to-face – over an extended period of time, given detailed briefing books on public policy issues as well as the chance to question one another and experts. Over time, they found dramatic shifts in the ways participants thought about the issues as they learned to listen to alternative viewpoints and factor diverse experiences and ideas into their thinking about the issues.” Jenkins, Henry. Convergence Culture; Where Old and New Media Collide. 2006. New York University Press. P. 235.


“The reason why Levy was optimistic that the emergence of a knowledge-based culture would enhance democracy and global understanding was that it would model new protocols for interacting across our differences. Of course, those protocols do not emerge spontaneously as an inevitable consequence of technological change. They will emerge through experimentation and conscious effort. This is part of what constitutes the ‘apprenticeship’ phase that Levy envisioned. We are still learning what it is like to operate within a knowledge culture. We are still debating and resolving the core principles that will define our interactions with each other.” Jenkins, Henry. Convergence Culture; Where Old and New Media Collide. 2006. New York University Press. P238.


“Just as studying fan culture helped us to understand the innovations that occur on the fringes of the media industry, we may also want to look at the structures of fan communities as showing us new ways of thinking about citizenship and collaboration. The political effects of these fan communities come not simply through the production and circulation of new ideas (the critical reading of favorite texts) but also through access to new social structures (collective intelligence) and new models of cultural production (participatory culture).” Jenkins, Henry. Convergence Culture; Where Old and New Media Collide. 2006. New York University Press. P. 246.


“By the appeal to values, we mean first of all that other propositions have not been taken into account, other entities have not been consulted–propositions and entities that seemed to have a right to be heard. Every time the debate over values appears, the number of parties involved, the range of stakeholders in the discussion, is always extended.” Latour, Bruno. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. 2004. Harvard University Press. Translated by Catherine Porter. Pp. 105-6.


“In contrast, a gradient is going to be established between the interior of the collective and its exterior, which will gradually fill up with excluded entities, beings that the collectivity has decided to do without, for which it has refused to take responsibility–let us remember that these entities can be humans, but also animal species, research programs, concepts, any of the rejected propositions that at one moment or another are consigned to the dumping ground of a given collective. We not longer have a society surrounded by a nature, but a collective producing a clear distinction between what it has internalized and what it has externalized.” Latour, Bruno. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. 2004. Harvard University Press. Translated by Catherine Porter. P. 124.


“The collective, as we understand now, is not a thing in the world, a being with fixed and definitive borders, but a movement of establishing provisional cohesion that will have to be started all over again every single day. Its borders, by definition, cannot be the object of any stabilization, any naturalization, despite the continual efforts of the great scientific narratives to unify what brings us all together under the auspices of nature. To this totalization, the politicians bring a provisional unity through the incessantly resumed circuit of its envelope, what I have called its progressive composition. The politicians do not hope to fall, by an unanticipated stroke of luck, on an already-constituted ‘whole,’ or even to compose once and for all an ‘us’ that would no longer need to be reconsidered. They expect the outline of the borders of the collective to come from nothing but the very movement of incessant resumption, rather like the way burning brands trace shapes in the darkness of night only through the rapid motion to which we subject them.” Latour, Bruno. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. 2004. Harvard University Press. Translated by Catherine Porter. Pp. 147-8.


“In order to grow, the collective needs these two functions , dispersed everywhere; one allows it to catch hold of the multitudes without crushing them, and the other allows it to get them to speak in a single voice without scattering.” Latour, Bruno. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. 2004. Harvard University Press. Translated by Catherine Porter. Pp. 149-150.


“Territory, authority, and rights are complex institutionalizations constituted through specific processes and arising out of struggles and competing interests. They are not simply attributes. They are interdependent, even as they maintain their specificity. Each can, thus, be identified. Specificity is partly conditioned by level of formalization and institutionalization. Across time and space, territory, authority, and rights have been assembled into distinct formations within which they have had variable levels of performance. Further, the types of instruments through which each gets constituted vary, as do the sites where each is in turn embedded–private or public, law or custom, metropolitan or colonial, national or supranational, and so on.”  Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 2006. Princeton University Press. Pp. 4-5.


“As political activity becomes the production of representation, the dynamic of commerce is reproduced in politics. Because political representations must contend with clutter, they must be packaged in a certain way, they must grab the most attention possible in the least amount of time and get across some simple message.” De Zengotita, Thomas. 2005. Mediated: How the Media Shapes Your World and the Way You Live in It. Bloomsbury. P. 134.


“In any case, that was how the pros began to describe the effect of mediation on politics, that was their take on the fact that politics was becoming representation.

“In concrete terms, this simply means that making presentations of some kind, and turning actual events into presentations of some kind, becomes what institutions are for. You can see it happening to some degree or another in whatever institution you are involved in, I’m sure, but it is especially true of political institutions.” De Zengotita, Thomas. 2005. Mediated: How the Media Shapes Your World and the Way You Live in It. Bloomsbury. Pp. 134-5.


“With the obligation to succeed, politicians shed their brightest light. ‘We have to get on with it, and in a hurry; time is passing; let’s decide.’ Such is the impulse that suddenly animates the second house when the politicians add their grain of salt. Researchers, too, know how to make decisions, to get on with it, as we have seen, but politicians add an even more indispensable skill: they can make enemies. Without this ability, the meaning of decisiveness, the ability to ‘cut to the chase,’ would be only the mark of arbitrariness–the arbitrariness that so frightened scientists in the other Constitution, worried as they were that they would be obliged to know too soon. Without the ability to divide the collective into friends and enemies, the requirement of closure could never be fulfilled: one would want to embrace everything, keep everything, satisfy everyone, all the humans and all the nonhumans together, and the collective, left agape, would no longer be able to learn, because it would no longer have the capacity to take up again, in the next cycle, the integration of the excluded entities that would have appealed.” Latour, Bruno. The Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. 2004. Harvard University Press. P. 146.


“Humans in modern societies are driven by a perhaps desperate hope that they might find some way of mobilising their theoretical and empirical knowledge and their evaluative systems so as both to locate themselves and their projects in some larger imaginative structure that makes sense to them, and to guide their actions to bring about what they would find to be satisfactory outcomes or to improve in some other way the life they life. Furthermore, many modern agents would like it to be the case that the form of orientation which their life has is, if not ‘true,’ at least compatible with the best available knowledge, and they would like the principles by which they guide their action to be in some kind of contact with reality, although anyone would be hard put to say precisely what was meant by that.” Geuss, Raymond. Philosophy and Real Politics. 2008. Princeton University Press. P. 42.


"In light of the widely perceived tension between the ‘partisan’ and ‘civic’ dimensions of public life, it is tempting to see these as polar opposites, and demand cynically or idealistically that they be separated. And yet in practice, they are deeply intertwined. Rather than seeing them as categorical opposites, or even as two poles on a continuum, we should look at the different ways in which partisanship and civic life come together. I have argued in this book that we can usefully distinguish between four skilled modes or ‘footings’ underlying democratic communication, which I have called exploratory dialogue, discursive positioning, reflective problem solving, and tactical maneuver. These are loosely associated with the ideas of Habermas, Gramsci, Dewey, and Machiavelli, respectively, although they are not just abstract theoretical models, but rather involve concrete sets of discursive practices." Mische, Ann. Partisan Publics: Communication and Contention across Brazilian Youth Activist Networks. 2008. Princeton University Press. Pp. 339-40.
 

"Political actors should avoid seeing one stylistic orientation as intrinsically better than another. All four modes of communication have characteristic strengths and weaknesses. Groups that are dominated by one particular mode will tend to shipwreck on those weaknesses, limiting the force of their social intervention. They may circle around in the free exchange of ideas until they peter out from lack of concrete proposals. They may retreat into ideological sectarianism, limiting their ability to make alliances or effectively intervene in the political field. They may become enmeshed in devious and cynical manipulations in the attempt to maintain institutional control, losing the trust of potential allies and recruits. Or they may go so far to avoid conflict that they reduce their intervention to technocratic problem solving." Mische, Ann. Partisan Publics: Communication and Contention across Brazilian Youth Activist Networks. 2008. Princeton University Press. Pp. 358-9.
 

"This view [‘law usually associated with jurists and often taught in law school’] approaches law as a more or less coherent set of principles and rules that relate to each other according to a particular logic or dynamic. The objects of study in jurisprudence is this internal logic and the rules and principles that circulate within it. According to this approach, law comprises a self-contained system that, with some notable exceptions, works like a syllogism, with abstract principles and legal precedents combined with the concrete facts of the issue at hand leading deductively to legal outcomes." Calavita, Kitty. Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. 2010. University of Chicago Press. P. 4.
 

"Anthropological evidence suggests that premodern societies used primarily restitutive law and more complex modern societies emphasize repressive sanctions, not vice versa." Calavita, Kitty. Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. 2010. University of Chicago Press. P. 16.
 

"Many of us follow the lead of anthropologists like Malinowski who have an inclusive view of law as any set of norms that regulates conduct and provides for social control; others insist on the benefits of terminological precision and, like Schwartz, argue that not all societies have ‘law,’ which, they say, only occurs when informal controls are weak." Calavita, Kitty. Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. 2010. University of Chicago Press. P. 150.
 

"Law is both ‘hegemonic and oppositional,’ simultaneously contributing to the taken-for-grantedness of existing social arrangements and provoking people to contest that power. Law can be both fatal to reform efforts and reformers’ best weapon." Calavita, Kitty. Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. 2010. University of Chicago Press. P. 151.
 

"Sovereignty is a hypothetical trade, in which two potentially (or really) conflicting sides, respecting de facto realities of power, exchange such recognitions as their least costly strategy." Wallerstein, Immanuel. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. 2004. Duke University Press. P. 44.
 

"From the point of view of entrepreneurs operating in the capitalist world-economy, the sovereign states assert authority in at least seven principal areas of direct interest to them: (1) States set the rules on whether and under what conditions commodities, capital, and labor may cross their borders. (2) They create the rules concerning property rights within their states. (3) They set rules concerning employment and the compensation of employees. (4) They decide which costs firms must internalize. (5) They decide what kinds of economic processes may be monopolized, and to what degree. (6) They tax. (7) Finally, when firms based within their boundaries may be affected, they can use their power externally to affect the decisions of other states." Wallerstein, Immanuel. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. 2004. Duke University Press. P. 46.
 

"Strength of states is most usefully defined as the ability to get legal decisions actually carried out. One simple measure that one might use is the percentage of taxes levied that are actually collected and reach the taxing authority." Wallerstein, Immanuel. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. 2004. Duke University Press. Pp. 52-3.
 

"There are however two quite different ways in which states might realize dominance. One is to transform the world-economy into a world-empire. The second is to obtain what may be called hegemony in the world-system. It is important to distinguish the two modalities, and to understand why no state has been able to transform the modern world-system into a world-empire but several states have, at different times, achieved hegemony." Wallerstein, Immanuel. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. 2004. Duke University Press. P. 57.
 

"In the modern world-system, there have been two basic reasons for taxation. One is to provide the state structures with the means to offer security services, build infrastructure, and employ a bureaucracy with which to provide public services as well as collect taxes. These costs are inescapable, although obviously there can be strong and wide differences in views as to what should be spent and how.

"There is however a second reason to tax, which is more recent. This second reason is the consequence of political democratization, which has led to demands by the citizenry on the states to provide them with three major benefits, which have come to be seen as entitlements: education, health, and guarantees of lifetime income." Wallerstein, Immanuel. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. 2004. Duke University Press. P. 82.
 

"Even if we assume that everyone is in fact in favor of liberty, which is a rash assumption, there is the enormous and never-ending difficulty of deciding what is the line between the liberty of the majority and the liberty of the minorities–that is, in what spheres and issues one or the other takes precedence. In the struggle over the system (or systems) that will succeed our existing world-system, the fundamental cleavage will be between those who wish to expand both liberties–that of the majority and that of the minorities–and those who will seek to create a non-libertarian system under the guise of preferring either the liberty of the majority or the liberty of the minorities. In such a struggle, it becomes clear what the role of opacity is in the struggle. Opacity leads to confusion, and this favors the cause of those who wish to limit liberty." Wallerstein, Immanuel. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. 2004. Duke University Press. P. 89.
 

"Americans and Zande therefore confront the dilemma faced by all societies in which a neutral is empowered to judge the disputes of others: how to legitimate that person’s decisions so that compliance is likely, so that the constituting authority is not (by unacceptable decisions) delegitimized, and so that the decision maker does not become an object of revenge by the losing party." Chase, Oscar. Law, Culture, and Ritual: Disputing Systems in Cross-cultural Context. 2005. New York University Press. P. 32.
 

Authors & Works cited in this section:

Bloom, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind
Brown, Wendy. Politics Out of History
Calavita, Kitty. Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law
Carse, James P., Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life
Chase, Oscar. Law, Culture, and Ritual: Disputing Systems in Cross-cultural Context
De Zengotita, T. Mediated: How the Media Shapes Your World
Funkenstein, Amos. Theology and the Scientific Imagination
Geuss, Raymond. Philosophy and Real Politics
Jenkins, Henry. Convergence Culture; Where Old and New Media Collide
Kahn, Paul. The Cultural Study of Law
Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern
Latour, Bruno. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy
Mann, Charles. 1491: New Revelations of the Americas
McAfee, Noelle. Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship.
Mische, Ann. Partisan Publics: Communication and Contention across Brazilian Youth
Morin, Edgar. Homeland Earth: A Manifesto for a New Millennium.
O. Brown, Norman, Love's Body
Rosenau, James. Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization
Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages
Wallerstein, Immanuel. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction

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